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ABSTRACT On December 26, 2011, in response to US, European, and potential Asian 
sanctions on Iranian oil exports, the government in Tehran issued a threat to “cut off the 
Strait of Hormuz.” The US Defense Department responded that any blockade of the strait 
would be met with force. On first read, it is easy to dismiss such saber rattling as another 
chapter in the new Cold War in the Middle East between Iran and its allies – including Syria, 
Hamas, and Hezbollah – and the US, Israel, and the Sunni Gulf States, mostly notably Saudi 
Arabia. Iran has since backed away from its threat, but the event still carries importance 
because it is unclear how both the US and Iran will continue to respond, particularly as the 
diplomatic and economic pressures grow more acute while Iran’s controversial nuclear 
program advances. Could such a verbal threat by Iran to cut off the Strait of Hormuz ignite a 
military conflagration in the region? The relationship between military conflict and oil supply 
disruptions is well established; however, policymakers and analysts tend to focus on the 
incidents in which military conflict causes disruptions in oil supplies and sharp increases in 
prices. The first and most obvious example of this dynamic was the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. 
The subsequent oil embargo by the Arab members of the Organization for Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the United States and the Netherlands for their support 
of Israel caused prices to soar as oil-consuming nations endured supply shortages.  The 
Iranian Revolution from 1978 to 1979 was another event that curtailed Western nations’ 
access to oil and caused prices to spike. When thinking about the relationship between 
military conflict and oil supply disruptions, however, policymakers and analysts should also 
recognize that the competition over oil – and even verbal threats to disrupt oil supplies by 
closing oil transit chokepoints – have either led directly to military conflict or have provided 
a useful cover under which countries have initiated military conflict. By examining past 
episodes when countries issued threats to close oil transit chokepoints, this Policy Brief helps 
illuminate the dangers associated with the current crisis over the Strait of Hormuz. 
 
 
HOW VERBAL THREATS TO CLOSE OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS LEAD TO MILITARY CONFLICT 
JOHN BOWLUS 
 
 
 
2
  
  
 G
L
O
B
A
L
 P
O
L
IT
IC
A
L
 T
R
E
N
D
S
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 (
G
P
o
T
) 
 
The Importance of Oil Transit 
Chokepoints in the Middle East  
The Western powers became interested in 
Middle East oil at the turn of the 
twentieth century and, by the beginning of 
the Second World War, the US, British, 
and Dutch oil companies controlled access 
to the reserves in the major oil-producing 
states: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia. During the postwar period, the US 
and Britain sought to safeguard their oil 
interests in the Persian Gulf area, which 
had become the new center of gravity for 
world oil production. Middle East oil 
would rebuild the war battered economies 
of Europe as well as Japan and would 
power the American military during the 
Cold War. Controlling the supply of oil, 
however, was only important if the oil 
could be transported to viable markets, 
specifically to the Mediterranean and then 
on to Western Europe, which got ninety 
percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf. For 
Persian Gulf oil to reach the Medi-
terranean, it had to pass through a series 
of oil-transit states, including Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt, 
which had the Suez Canal. Instability 
within or conflict between these oil-transit 
states therefore became a serious concern 
of American and Western European 
policymakers beginning in the 1950s. 
Four maritime chokepoints have been 
critical to the transit of oil to Europe: the 
Turkish Straits; the Suez Canal and its 
environs, which includes the Straits of 
Tiran; the Mandab Strait; and the Strait of 
Hormuz.
1
 
                                            
1
 A fifth chokepoint concerning Middle East oil, 
the Strait of Malacca, is of key strategic 
importance to China, Korea, and Japan. Since 
the American and Chinese navies dominate 
these waters it is difficult to envision the 
Since the signing of the Montreux 
Convention in 1936, the Turkish Straits 
have operated without interruption, 
except for accidental shipwrecks. (In the 
late 1940s, the Soviet Union pressured 
Turkey to allow Russian bases in the 
Straits, but, with American backing, Turkey 
resisted Russian advances.) On the other 
hand, the Suez Canal and its environs, 
including the Straits of Tiran, were 
theaters of two major conflicts in 1956 
and 1967 and will be discussed in greater 
detail below. The most proximate cause of 
these conflicts was verbal threats by Egypt 
to block oil transit chokepoints. And while 
the Mandab Strait, which marks the 
entrance to the Red Sea from the Arabian 
Sea, is currently vulnerable to hijackings 
by Somali pirates, some of whose most 
valuable scores have been oil tankers, 
these hijackings have only impacted oil 
prices to a small extent and have not 
disrupted supplies. Indeed, the Mandab 
                                                                
Straits being blocked; however, a closure, if 
prolonged, would have serious repercussions 
for the world economy. The Panama Canal and 
the Danish Straits are two other chokepoints, 
but they do not involve the transportation of 
Middle Eastern oil. 
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Strait has historically remained immune 
from the oil transit crises connected with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Of the four straits, the Strait of Hormuz is 
the most important chokepoint for oil 
transportation, since 
supertankers transpor-
ting Persian Gulf oil 
have no other outlet to 
the seas and forward 
markets. In the postwar 
era, military conflict has 
not disrupted this 
chokepoint, although 
there were light, small-
scale clashes between 
the Americans and 
Iranians at the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war in 
1988. The current 
American-Iranian standoff bears some 
resemblance, but the stakes now are 
much higher in light of Iran’s nuclear 
program. As a result, the US has ratcheted 
up sanctions and brought along its 
European and Asian allies to bring 
economic pressure on Iran. The US holds 
the military balance of power and Iran 
would lose massive amounts of revenues 
in oil exports – not to mention the 
blockage of imports – if the Strait was 
shut, but the regime could decide that 
blocking the Strait is its only option in an 
act of desperation. Moreover, the US or 
Israel could use such an act as an excuse 
to launch a military strike against Iran. 
 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 and Arab-
Israeli War of 1967 
Since the early 1950s, oil-producing 
countries in the Middle East have 
recognized the importance of oil to the 
Western powers and have sought to 
harness oil as a political weapon. Iran was 
the first Middle Eastern country to 
attempt to nationalize its assets. In 1951, 
following months of unrest and strikes by 
oil workers, the popular leader, 
Mohammad Mossadegh, emerged and led 
the Iranian Parliament 
to nationalize the British 
Petroleum (BP) Com-
pany’s holdings in the 
country. The British 
could not countenance 
the loss, and, with the 
help of the American 
CIA, ousted Mossadegh 
and reinstalled the Shah. 
Oil production was turn-
ed over to an American, 
British, French, and 
Dutch Consortium, 
which controlled production until 1979. 
Although the Iranian supply was cut off for 
almost three years from 1951 to 1954, the 
disruption did not materially affect oil-
consuming nations. Nonetheless, the brief 
episode of Iranian nationalization set the 
precedent for a more brazen challenge to 
Western control of oil by Egypt in 1956.  
Egypt was a crucial transit route for Asian-
European trade and particularly for British 
rule in India even before the building of 
the Suez Canal in 1869. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, British trade 
had grown dependent on the quicker 
route through Suez, and with the advent 
of Persian Gulf oil the canal became even 
more critical to the Western powers. In 
1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser, a colonel in the 
Egyptian army, overthrew the Egyptian 
monarchy and entered office determined 
to throw off the yoke of British and French 
imperialism. By 1955, Nasser was playing 
the Soviet Union and the United States off 
one another in order to increase his own 
prestige and power. He purchased arms 
from Czechoslovakia in September 1955, 
Egypt was a crucial transit route 
for Asian-European trade and 
particularly for British rule in India 
even before the building of the 
Suez Canal in 1869. By the late 
nineteenth century, however, 
British trade had grown 
dependent on the quicker route 
through Suez, and with the advent 
of Persian Gulf oil the canal 
became even more critical to the 
Western powers. 
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but received Anglo-American aid in 
December 1955 to build a new dam at 
Aswan. When Nasser recognized the 
People’s Republic of China in May 1956, 
the West decided to check Nasser and 
withdrew the funds for the Aswan dam in 
July 1956. Nasser, claiming that he needed 
revenue to build the dam, took the 
extraordinary step of nationalizing the 
British and French owned Suez Canal 
Company on July 26, 1956. He also 
announced the closure of the canal as well 
as the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. 
Nasser’s moves directly threatened British 
and French financial interests in the 
company. More importantly, the US, 
Britain, and France all worried that Nasser 
intended to hold them 
hostage to further 
demands by cutting off 
Europe’s most important 
oil transit route for 
Persian Gulf crude. In 
fact, Nasser invoked the 
possibility of using oil 
transportation as a 
weapon when he called 
on Syria in a speech in 
August 1956 to sabotage 
the pipelines running from Iraq, a British 
ally, in the event of Western action against 
Egypt.  For Israel, the blockade of the Gulf 
of Aqaba would deny it access to oil from 
the Persian Gulf, but at this time Israel 
received the majority of its oil imports 
from BP via the Western Hemisphere, 
which were unloaded at Mediterranean 
Sea ports. Moreover, the Egyptian 
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was bluster 
since the Egyptians did not stop a single 
ship destined for Israel. 
It is unclear to what extent the threat of 
cutting off oil supplies either genuinely 
frightened Britain, France, and Israel into 
action or served as an excuse for them to 
launch an attack and regain control of the 
canal. The US supported a diplomatic 
solution and indeed the Western powers 
could have worked out a modus operandi 
whereby oil transportation was not 
disrupted and military conflict was 
avoided; after all, Nasser needed the toll 
revenues to fund the dam project among 
other aspirations. The British and French, 
nonetheless, could not absorb the 
attendant loss of prestige and erosion of 
their positions in the Middle East. 
Consequently, the two governments 
contacted Israel about launching a joint 
attack. Israel saw the opportunity to grab 
control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai 
Peninsula, and, on October 29, 1956, 
Israeli forces quickly took the Sinai and the 
Straits of Tiran. The three 
countries had hidden the 
plans from the US, and, 
when President Eisen-
hower learned of the 
attack, he denounced the 
actions of his allies. Since 
Britain, France, and Israel 
devised their plans in 
secret and believed that 
an alternative transit 
route for oil could not be 
found, diplomatic tension boiled over into 
military conflict. 
In response to the attack, Nasser blocked 
the Suez Canal, and the Syrians, in 
solidarity with Nasser, cut off the flow of 
oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean. With 
both the Suez Canal and oil pipeline 
closed, the West’s oil supplies were 
curtailed, although it was able to make up 
for the shortfall by increasing Western 
Hemisphere production. Western govern-
ments and oil companies also devised 
numerous schemes to transport oil from 
the Persian Gulf without passing through 
the Suez Canal or Syria. The primary 
strategy was to accelerate the building of 
massive oil tankers, which could transport 
From 1957 to 1967, oil transit 
routes continued to cause 
tensions between Middle 
Eastern states. From 1957 to 
1961, British Petroleum, out of 
concern for its interests 
elsewhere in the Arab world, 
ended its direct relationship in 
supplying oil to the Israelis via 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
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oil around the Cape of Good Hope in 
Africa and then north to Rotterdam and 
other European ports. Western nations 
and oil companies also began drawing up 
plans to build an anti-Nasser pipeline from 
Iraq to Turkey, which would bypass Syria 
altogether. This scheme was dropped in 
spring 1958 because Iraq did not want to 
anger its Arab neighbor, Syria, by 
transporting oil through non-Arab Turkey.  
By March 1957, the US had compelled all 
British, French, and Israeli forces out of 
Egypt, and oil transit through the Suez 
Canal was restarted. The peace, however, 
would barely last ten years before another 
major military conflict erupted. From 1957 
to 1967, oil transit routes continued to 
cause tensions between Middle Eastern 
states. From 1957 to 1961, BP, out of 
concern for its interests elsewhere in the 
Arab world, ended its direct relationship in 
supplying oil to the Israelis via the 
Mediterranean Sea. During that same 
period, Iran became Israel’s sole supplier 
of oil, which made the Straits of Tiran an 
oil transit chokepoint of existential 
importance to Israel.
2
 
 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 
 Much like the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israeli 
War of 1967 resulted from a verbal threat 
from Egypt to cut off the free tran-
sportation of oil, but whereas Britain and 
France were involved in the Suez Crisis, 
the 1967 conflict was strictly an Arab-
Israeli affair. By 1967, relations between 
Israel and its neighbors had grown 
increasingly bleak and were characterized 
                                            
2
 Israel’s lack of indigenous oil supplies along 
with Arab antipathy towards Israel made the 
country’s oil policy a highly secretive matter 
and one of grave importance to its national 
security.    
by a number of border clashes between 
Israel and Syria. In April 1967, Israel 
downed six Syrian jets in a major air battle 
above the Golan Heights. In mid-May 
Nasser, sensing the moment to reassert 
himself – his prestige in the Arab world 
had slowly declined during the 1960s, in 
part due to the disastrous war in Yemen – 
asked the United Nations to remove its 
forces stationed in the Sinai since 1957. He 
then positioned his own troops in the Sinai 
on the border with Israel and announced 
on May 23, 1967 that he was closing the 
Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping.  
According to the archival record of the US 
State Department, Israel decided to use 
Nasser’s verbal threat to block off the 
Straits as a casus belli in order to strike a 
devastating blow to Nasser and capture 
the Sinai: “the decision was made to fight 
rather than to surrender to a blockade in 
Aqaba; Israel would not try to live on one 
lung. It had delayed thus far in striking 
because of President Johnson’s urgings.” 
When the Johnson Administration 
rejected this rationale for war, Israel 
shifted its argument, claiming that 
Nasser’s troops in the Sinai represented 
an existential threat and that an Egyptian 
attack was imminent. Historians have 
since demonstrated that Nasser’s moves 
were bluster. The blockade was never 
enforced, and the US military and 
intelligence agencies had assessed the 
Egyptian forces and found them to be 
undermanned, lacking in military 
hardware, and without intention to attack. 
An Israeli strike, therefore, was 
unjustified; moreover, if it were to occur, 
there was no question about the outcome. 
Given the changing rationales for a strike 
offered by the Israeli leadership to the US, 
one can conclude that Israel sought to find 
a reason to initiate war with Egypt, and 
Nasser’s brinkmanship provided it. Due to 
the lack of diplomacy between Egypt and 
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Israel and Israel’s lack of an additional 
transit route by which it could receive oil 
supplies, military conflict erupted.  
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise 
attack, overwhelmed Egyptian forces 
within six days, and occupied the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and the waters 
in the Gulf of Suez. Thereafter, the Suez 
Canal was shutdown from 1967 to 1975, 
forcing Western oil companies to sail 
around the Cape of Good Hope with 
supertankers. The Arab-Israeli War of 
1967 not only enhanced Israel’s position in 
terms of oil transportation by giving it 
control over the Suez Canal and the Straits 
of Tiran but it also greatly increased its 
supplies. In the 1960s, oil and gas had 
been discovered in the Gulf of Suez and 
the Sinai Peninsula. Israel now controlled 
these supplies and during the 1970s 
became both energy independent and a 
net exporter of oil for the first time in its 
history. When Egypt and Israel signed the 
Sinai II agreement in 1975, the Suez Canal 
reopened, Egypt no longer posed a threat 
to block the passage of oil, and regional 
conflict over oil transit significantly 
abated. 
Turkey and France suffered the most from 
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, 
which brought each country closer to oil-
rich states in the Middle 
East, most notably Iraq. 
When the conflict erupted, 
a grouping of Arab oil-
producing and oil-transit 
states launched a three-
month oil embargo against 
the United States and 
Britain. In fact, Iraq was the 
first to limit its supply and, 
along with Syria, blocked the 
Mediterranean pipeline. This denial of oil 
impacted Turkish foreign policy planners, 
complicating its alliance with Israel within 
the Western orbit and bringing it closer to 
Iraq in the subsequent years. In fact, only 
one month into the embargo, Iraq and 
Syria made specific arrangements for only 
two countries – Turkey and France – to lift 
oil from the port at Banias, Syria. France 
went even further than Turkey in openly 
severing its relations with Israel over the 
war and built trading relations with Iraq 
and other Arab oil-producing countries 
whereby France sold weapons in exchange 
for oil.  
 
Recommendations for Turkey 
In the Suez Crisis of 1956 and Arab-Israeli 
War of 1967, verbal threats to oil security 
combined with intense diplomatic 
pressures to create untenable situations. 
This combination resembles today’s 
standoff between the US and Iran in the 
Persian Gulf. If the Strait of Hormuz was 
closed, the world economy would suffer 
from disruptions in supply and increases in 
prices, and Turkey’s economy would not 
escape the damage. Turkey should have 
contingency plans on hand in case such a 
scenario emerges and should be aware 
that saber rattling and verbal threats to 
block oil transit routes 
should be taken seriously. 
Historically, Turkey has 
played a unique and 
important role in helping to 
avoid conflict in the Middle 
East through diplomacy. In 
the current standoff 
between the US and Iran, 
Turkey has already 
mitigated tensions and it should continue 
to consider this role a high priority. 
If the Strait of Hormuz was 
closed, the world economy 
would suffer from 
disruptions in supply and 
increases in prices, and 
Turkey’s economy would 
not escape the damage. 
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Another way Turkey can work to avoid 
regional conflict over oil transportation is 
to continue to seek to diversify its transit 
routes for energy supplies. One reason for 
Turkey’s strong economic performance 
during the 1980s was that the price of oil 
plummeted by the middle of the decade, 
and Turkey had gained direct access to 
Iraqi crude via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. 
The political and economic challenges 
facing Turkey and Iraq in the 1970s were 
immense. Turkey suffered from low levels 
of foreign currency, the bulk of which 
went towards purchasing oil. The invest-
ment made by both Turkey and Iraq in the 
pipeline in the 1970s was rewarded in the 
1980s, when a second, parallel line 
between Kirkuk and Ceyhan was 
constructed. Such pipeline schemes can 
seem financially daun-
ting and even unsound 
in the planning stages, 
but can pay extremely 
large dividends, parti-
cularly in how they 
provide diversification 
for a country’s supply.  
In fact, the creation of 
more alternatives for oil 
transportation helped 
reduce military conflict 
between Egypt and 
Israel. After the closure of the Suez Canal 
in 1967, Israel built a pipeline in 1970 that 
collected Iranian crude at Eilat on the Gulf 
of Aqaba and pumped it to Ashkelon on 
the Mediterranean coast, from where it 
could be reloaded on tankers and shipped 
to Europe. In 1977, Egypt completed the 
Suez-Mediterranean pipeline, which re-
ceived Arab Persian Gulf crude at Ain 
Sukhna on the Gulf of Suez and pumped it 
to Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast, 
from where it was also loaded on to 
tankers and shipped to Europe. The Suez 
Canal reopened in 1975 and by 1977 there 
were three routes through the Suez Canal 
environs by which Persian Gulf oil could 
transit onward to Europe. In 1978, Egypt 
and Israel signed the Camp David Accords, 
and the two countries have since be-
nefitted from peaceful relations. While oil 
transportation was only one of many 
factors influencing Egyptian-Israeli rela-
tions, it is clear that the expansion of oil 
transit options helped reduce diplomatic 
tensions.  
Finally, international agreements are 
essential in maintaining the security of oil 
transit chokepoints, including the Strait of 
Hormuz. In 1982, the United Nations 
produced a series of conventions regard-
ing the transit of vessels through strategic 
maritime chokepoints. Iran and the United 
Arab Emirates have 
signed the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 
but have not ratified it, 
whereas Turkey, Syria, 
and Israel have not 
signed it. Each country 
has important national 
reasons for withholding 
full support, but all 
countries should pursue 
some type of UN-
sponsored, international 
agreement regarding the 
regulation of maritime chokepoints 
because it would reduce the potential for 
military conflict.  
An examination of the history of 
international agreements concerning oil 
transit chokepoints, along with an analysis 
of the role played by oil pipelines as viable 
alternatives for oil transportation, are 
both topics that can further inform 
discussions about the current crisis over 
the Strait of Hormuz.  
 
Each country has important 
national reasons for withholding 
full support [of the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea], but all 
countries should pursue some 
type of UN-sponsored, 
international agreement 
regarding the regulation of 
maritime chokepoints because it 
would reduce the potential for 
military conflict. 
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